Kad covjek ne shvaca nauk o vjecnosti vec sam trabunja gluposti ne moze mu se pomoc. Ja mu dam sluzbeni tumac Katolicke Crkve sto je to vjecnost, i da u vjecnosti postoji samo @sada@ a on i dalje trabunja gluposti koje je sam samcat izmislio. Nigdje sluzbenog Katolickog nauka > Izjava da Bog nije van vremena
I mi se onda cudimo kako ljudi vjeruju u molitvu za gotovo svrseno vrijeme
Uglavnom, evo ti citat sv. Tome Akvinskog. Ako te ja nisam mogao uvjerit, onda te mozda sv. Toma moze uvjerit:
Objection 1. It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
Objection 2. Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.
Reply to Objection 1. Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.
Reply to Objection 2. As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.
Eto, valjda shvatis da se proslost dogodila, i da Bog ne moze ic kontra logike i zdravog razuma, ne moze bit kontradiktoran > mijenjat proslost uzevsi u obzir sadasnjost. Proslost se dogodila i Bog je ne moze promijenit, i zato se nelogicno molit za proslo svrseno vrijeme, jer Bog mora postivat logiku.
Uostalom to mi se svrdi na to da se milost Bozija moze izvojevat.. Prakticni semiplegijanci
